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Abstract 
 
This paper attempts to answer the question: does the current employment management system of civil 
service in Tunisia incentivize performance? This paper is a case study that provides background 
information on the Tunisian civil service employment, and offers analysis based on existing legislation 
and reports, as well as expert interviews. The paper’s findings are: First, it does not have an evaluation 
system that separates high performers from low performers. Second, the current compensation structure 
and promotion mechanisms do not reward high performers.  
Based on the Tunisian context and other different case studies, this paper makes suggestions regarding 
approach to reform, evaluation system and reward system. Recommendations include decentralization, 
design of a job catalogue and quantifiable evaluation metrics, as well as reform of compensation structure 
and promotion mechanisms to better tie them to performance.  
Keywords: civil service, employment system, performance, evaluation system, reward  
Discipline: Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Public services in Tunisia have generally been criticized by citizens. In February 2017, the 
satisfaction rate with public services in Tunisia was only 44% (Sondage: l'administration 
insatisfaisante pour 56% des tunisiens. Mosaique FM), significantly lower than the OECD 2012 
average, which ranges from 60% to 72% depending on the service category in 2012 (OECD 
2013). While public management involves different elements, this paper focuses on employment 
management, more specifically the management of incentives. 
While industrial relations are different between the private and public sectors, and while this 
paper recognizes the existence of some degree of intrinsic motivation in civil service, there is a 
reason to believe that the management of incentives plays a central role in employee 
performance. This paper draws on “Agency Theory” – used in the literature - to justify the 
premise of this paper: that there should be a link between incentives and performance (OECD 
2005).  “Agency Theory”, argues that “performance incentives are needed when the principal 
(the employer) cannot easily monitor the agent’s (employee’s) work effort”( (OECD 2005). 
Monitoring being impossible (at least in the narrow definition of the term), public sector 
employment presents an example of a principal-agent problem where the government is the 
principle (which provides the economic sources), and the employee being the agent (who acts on 
the behalf of the principle) (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Many countries have acknowledged this 
reality, as demonstrated by an increasing adoption of the “New Public Management” (NPM), 
which introduces market-oriented governance mechanisms and private sector techniques of 
human resource management (Bordogna 2008). 
This paper explores whether the current civil service employment management system in Tunisia 
incentivizes high performance. To answer this question, the paper draws on examination of 
Tunisian legislation, analysis reports and academic literature, as well as expert interviews. The 
paper finds that the current evaluation system does not separate low from high performers, and 
that the compensation structure and promotion mechanisms in place do not reward high 
performers. 
The paper then proposes reforms that derive from the current analysis as well as the examination 
of relevant case studies. Recommendations include decentralization, design of a job catalogue 
and quantifiable evaluation metrics, more emphasis on Performance-related pay (PRP) and 
redesign of promotion mechanisms.  
This paper aims to contribute an analysis-based perspective to individuals and entities interested 
in civil service employment reform in Tunisia. It also presents a case study of civil service 
employment management and public management. Finally, the paper gives substantial 
background details, which could help introduce unfamiliar and yet interested researchers, to the 
complex employment management system of the Tunisian civil service. 
 
Background  
 
1- Public Sector Structure: 
 
Public sector, civil service and employment regimes: 
Tunisia’s public sector is constituted of both government administrative agencies and state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) (Portail de la Présidence du Gouvernement – Tunisie n.d.), so public 
sector employment includes both civil service and employment in state-owned enterprises (Saidi, 
Administrator Advisor in the eneral Committee of the Civil Service 2017). Civil service agents 
are (1) State Officials - or officials who work in ministries, (2) employees of local authorities 
(municipal and regional councils) and (3) employees in state institutions of administrative nature. 
These are state agencies that do not have financial autonomy or their own legal status: rights and 
obligations, but rather derive from the government. (Saidi 2017). The focus of this paper will be 
civil service because it is related to establishments that are less likely to be part of privatization 
discussions, at least in the near future. 
More generally, the public sector employment is governed by eight different employment 
regimes, one of which is related to employment in state-owned enterprises, and seven of which 
fall under the civil service umbrella and include: (1) Officials of the State, Local Authorities and 
State Institutions of Administrative Nature, (2) Members of the Judiciary, (3) Members of the 
Administrative Court, (4) Members of the Court of Auditors, (5) Members of the Military, (6) 
Members of the Internal Security Forces and (7) Custom Agents (Zarrouk, Séminaire: "Les 
approches Comparatives sur la Modernisation de la Fonction Publique des Pays de l'OCDE" 
2008). The focus of the paper is the first cited regime: Officials of the state, Local Authorities 
and State Institutions, because this regime covers most civil service employees and is not highly 
specialized, and will therefore not require technical knowledge of fields, unlike the military, 
internal security, customs or the judicial branch. This focus regime – generally referred to as 
“General Civil Service” - is further divided into officials (“fonctionnaires”), workers 
(“ouvriers”)1, temporary staff (“personnel temporaire”) (Law 83-112, Article 16 1983). This 
paper will focus on officials and will refer to them as “civil servants”.  
The public sector employment regime is also divided into 130 “corps” or professional groups, 
including the corps of teachers, the corps of financial inspectors, the corps of general 
administrators (“corps administratif commun”) (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). 
This notion of “corps” will be relevant to future sections of the paper. 
Governing authority and legislation: 
All employment regimes are governed by the law. The body responsible for managing public 
sector employment policies is the General Committee of the Civil Service (CGFP), which is part 
of the Chief of Government Cabinet (Ministere de l'Action et de la Fonction Publique n.d.). The 
focus employment regime in this paper -  the “General Civil Service” regime – is governed by 
the law 83-112 of December 12,1983, known as the “General Statute of Civil Service”. This 
Statute is the foundational law that governs public employment management, ranging from 
compensation to recruitment and promotion mechanisms.  
Specifics of public employment management are governed by complementary decrees and corps-
specific decrees, known as “Particular Statutes”. Decrees are results of parliamentary voting, and 
are issued in the Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia (“Journal Officiel de la Republique 
Tunisienne”: JORT), signed by the Chief of the Executive Branch, previously the President of 
the Republic until 2011 and currently the Head of Government – equivalent to Prime Minister – 
as dictated by the new constitution of January 26th, 2014. Public-employment specifics in 
Particular Statutes only depend on the corps not on the organization per se, and are therefore 
                                                          
1 In a less technical word, workers can be thought of as blue-collar workers 
uniform across all government administrative agencies if the corps is found in more than one 
agency.  
Public employment management decisions of administrative order, such as recruitment opening, 
content of entry exams, announcements of promoted agents, are announced by the ministry of 
interest in an Order also published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia (JORT). 
2- Civil Service Employment Overview 
Civil service in Tunisia follows a career-based system, which is inspired by the French 
Administration, and is also followed by other Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, 
such as Algeria, Lebanon and Morocco (OECD 2010). In this system, an employee is typically 
recruited in a specific grade that correspond to their education degree, receives seniority-based 
pay increases, is tenured within a relatively short amount of time, and has limited mobility across 
government agencies (OECD 2010). This is different from the position-based system, which is 
the United Kingdom’s Westminster model, and is followed by some MENA countries, such as 
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan and UAE (OECD 2010). This system is generally characterized by more 
flexibility and recruitment based on technical skills (OECD 2010). 
Education-based classification: Categories 
When recruited, employees are places in grades that correspond to categories, exclusively 
determined by level of education. They could move up these grades through internal promotion. 
The specific grades depend on the corps that the employee belongs to, but these grades 
correspond to one of 4 categories: A,B,C and D. Category A is further divided into subcategories 
A1, A2 and A3 (Law 83-112, Article 16 1983). The table below summarizes these categories and 
corresponding levels of education. The third column is an illustrative example of how categories 
translate into grades, using the corps of general administrators (“corps administratif commun”) 
as the focus corps (Decree 85-261, Articles 2,3 and 4; Decree 85-267, Article 3 1985). 
Category Corresponding level of education Grade 
A1 Masters degree or equivalent General Administrator ("Administrateur Général") 
    Chief Administrator ("Administrateur en Chef") 
    Advisory Administrator ("Administrateur Conseiller") 
A2 Bachelor degree or equivalent Administrator ("Administrateur") 
A3 2 years of university  Administration Officer ("Attaché d’Administration") 
    Executive Officer ("Attaché de Direction") 
B High school diploma Secretary of Administration ("Secrétaire d’Administration") 
    Executive Secretary ("Secrétaire de Direction") 
C 
Some high school: 4 years after 
elementary school Administrative Clerk ("Commis d’Administration") 
    Typist ("Dactylographe") 
D Completed elementary school Typist Assistant ("Dactylographe Adjoint") 
    Front Desk Receptionist ("Agent D'accueil") 
 
In addition to grades, employees can be appointed to managerial positions, including Head of 
Service (“Chef de Service”), Assistant Director (“Sous-Directeur”), Director (“Directeur”), 
Managing Director (“Directeur Géneral”) and Secretary General in the Ministry (“Secrétaire 
Général du Ministère”) (Saidi 2017). These appointments are less automatic, as they are rather 
related to employees’ experiences and careers as civil servants. 
Civil Service Employment Management Overview 
Before identifying the areas where performance and incentives are disconnected and the 
implications of these disconnections, we explain in this section the basics of employment 
management system in Tunisia: recruitment, compensation structure, promotion and sanctions. 
Recruitment 
50% of positions in the categories A, B and C are filled through external recruiting, the other 
50% are filled through internal promotion (Law 83-112 1983). External recruiting for these 
categories happens in two ways. First, employees may be recruited through competitive 
recruitment procedures (“concours”), which takes the form of exams or applications-based 
selection (“concours sur dossier”) (Law 83-112 1983). Procedural details are determined by the 
Particular Statutes (Law 83-112 1983). Eligibility criteria usually include the required level of 
education, which is in many times defined by an exact degree, as opposed to being the minimum 
required. For example, a person who holds a Masters degree may not be eligible for a position 
that requires a Bachelor’s degree. Second, employees may be recruited through direct 
appointment if they are students from approved schools such as L’Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration (Law 83-112 1983). 
Recruiting for category D occurs only externally, and procedural details are determined by the 
Particular Statute in the specifically associated decree (Law 83-112 1983). 
Compensation structure 
Compensation for Civil Service employees is constituted of the base salary, allowances - 
including common allowances, corps-specific allowances and special allowances - and a 
quarterly performance bonus (Decree 72-358 1972). Employees with managerial positions 
(“fonctions”) receive managerial allowances too (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). 
Most the salary is based on the salary base and allowances; only about 2% of total compensation 
is based on performance.2  
Each corps has a salary grid, constituted of two types of base salary increases: seniority-based 
increase and promotion-based increase. The seniority-based increase is automatic, and the 
increase rate and frequency are determined by the Particular Statute. In general, there is an 
                                                          
2 Informal interview  
increase every year for the first 4 years, then every 2 years thereafter. There exists 25 levels so 
that an employee who joins at age 18 and stays in the same grade until retirement at 65 would be 
able to keep receiving salary increases over the 47 years of their career (Saidi 2017). A 
promotion results in a promotion-based increase, but resets seniority-based level to the first level 
– unless this would result in a lower salary than the pre-promotion salary. In this case, the 
employee stays at their current seniority-based level (Law 83-112 1983).  
 
 
Promotion 
When ministries decide to open positions, 50% occur through external recruitment, as previously 
stated, and 50% occur internally (Law 83-112 1983). Some ambiguity exists around promotions, 
based on different legislative texts (Law 83-112 and Decree 85-262). Combining article 18 from 
the Law 83-112 and articles 2 through 7 of Decree 85-262, there are three ways of promotion. 
The first is successful completion of a continuous training cycle. The second is an internal 
competitive recruitment procedure (“concours interne”), but only employees with 5 years 
seniority in their current grade are eligible for this promotion mode. The third, called “choice-
based promotion”, uses a point-based system and is only used for 10% of civil servants to be 
promoted, who have at least 10 years of seniority in current grade, as an opportunity to be 
promoted if other means did not work out. It is only offered once in an employee’s career. The 
minister from the ministry of interest announces the promoted employees in an Order published 
in the Official Journal of the Republic of Tunisia (JORT). 
Tenure and Sanctions 
Automatic tenure is implied after 4 years of employment (Law 83-112 1983). Disciplinary action 
includes warning, rebuke and termination of employment contract (even given tenure) without 
prior notice (Law 83-112 1983). It was found, however, that besides warning and rebuke, 
sanctions (such as temporary suspension, transfer with change of residence, and dismissal) are 
very rare (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015).  
3- Civil Service Size:  
Most recent statistics (2015) 
The number of civil service employees across all civil service employment regimes reached 
604,200 in 2015 of which 36.3% are women and 478,800 of which are civil servants (the focus 
employees in this paper) (National Institute of Statistics 2015).3  
The number of civil servants is highest in the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Public Health, 
Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Youth and Sports, respectively. 
Ministry Number of Civil Servants Percentage of Civil Servants 
Ministry of Education 171,657 36.3% 
Ministry of Public Health 57,941 12.2%  
                                                          
3 Caractéristique des agents de la fonction publique 2011-2015 – Partie 1 : L’évolution des caractéristiques des 
agents de la fonction publique 2011-2015 – par l’institut national de statistiques 
Ministry of Higher Education 
and Scientific Research 
25,166 5.3%  
 
Ministry of Finance 16,453 3.5% 
Ministry of Youth and Sports 15,607 3.3% 
 
The number of civil servants is divided into categories as follows, showing that over 60% of civil 
servants have at least some university education. Moreover, A2 category civil servants represent 
the highest percentage of all civil servants, which may be partially explained by governments’ 
efforts to limit unemployment of university graduates (A2 corresponds to holders of Bachelor’s 
degrees). 
 
 
Evolution of numbers since 2011: 
Since the Arab Spring that concluded in a political change in Tunisia on January 14th, 2011, the 
country has been undergoing a democratic transition, and that also did not come without 
economic challenges. With declining foreign investment and GDP growth as well as increasing 
unemployment, the government played the role of employer of last resort (Brockmeyer, 
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Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). In fact, the number of civil servants increased by about 25%, 
going from 352,200 in 2011 to 474,800 in 2015 (National Institute of Statistics 2015). 
This change is more noticeable in categories A2 and A3 where numbers doubled in category A2, 
compared to drop in numbers by a third in the A3 category. This could be explained by the wave 
of recruitment and possibly the increased number of those automatically promoted from category 
A2 to category A3 category (National Institute of Statistics 2015). The increase is also noticeable 
in the C category, where numbers almost quadrupled, increasing from 14,000 to 49,900 between 
2011 and 2015 (National Institute of Statistics 2015). 
Category 2011 2015 
A2 87,200 162,300 
A3 109,400 83,700 
 
The three ministries with highest increase rates in the total number of employees (including both 
civil servants and workers) between 2011 and 2015 are the Ministry of Public Health, Ministry 
of Agriculture and Ministry of Youth and Sports with percentage increases of 115%, 92% and 
43% respectively (National Institute of Statistics 2015). While low in percentage increase, The 
Ministry of Education added a significant number of recruits (L’Ecole Nationale 
d’Administration n.d.). 
Ministry Approximate percentage 
increase 
Number of recruits 
Ministry of Public Health 115% 14,570 
Ministry of Agriculture 92% 13,900 
Ministry of Youth and Sports 43% 5,450 
Ministry of Education 0.5% 9,980 
 
These increases are also reflected in the rise in numbers of “corps” (professional groups) from 
114 in 2008 to 130 in 2015 (Zarrouk, Séminaire: "Les approches Comparatives sur la 
Modernisation de la Fonction Publique des Pays de l'OCDE" 2008), which could be largely due 
to the desire of different groups to have additional specific rights or advantages.  
Current “Wage Bill” crisis 
After the revolution, the government has not only been pressured to increase recruiting but also 
to increase compensation. For example, 7 strikes were organized in June 2015 by State-Owned 
Enterprises employees alone (Temps 2015). 
The median pre-tax salary of civil service employees (both civil servants and workers) increased 
from 1127.5 TND in 2011 to 1388.9 TND in 2015 (National Institute of Statistics 2015). 
 
This increase in median salary is explained by a decrease in number of employees in the lower 
partition of salaries and increase in number of employees in the higher paritition of salaries, 
reflecting an overall increase in salaries of Civil Servants (National Institute of Statistics 2015). 
Salary range (in TND) Percentage in 2011 Percentage in 2015 
Lower than 700  3.2 0.3 
700-900 17.8 2.5 
900-1100 21.5 13.6 
1100-1300 27.8 24 
1127.5
1184.7
1287.3
1334.3
1388.9
1000
1100
1200
1300
1400
1500
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Increase in the Monthly Median Salary (TND)
1300-1500 11.1 16.3 
1500-1700 6.6 19.9 
1700-2000 4.5 13.3 
2000 and higher 7.5 10.1 
 
Today, the wage bill is budgeted to 52% of the total 2018 budget.4 5 With about 20% budgeted 
for external debt payment, less than 30% of the budget is left for development-oriented 
investments, and the government does not really have any fiscal space.6  
That being said, we believe that the current crisis is a manifestation of an underlying structural 
problem, and the groups-led changes reflect a weak current system/non-systematic changes 
reflect flaws in the system. In this paper, we hope to shed light on some of the weaknesses and 
offer alternatives. 
 
Analysis 
This paper argues that a major weakness in the Tunisian civil service’s employment management 
system is that it does not incentivize high performance. First, the evaluation system in place does 
not separate high performers from low performers in a systematic way. Second, the current 
compensation structure and promotion mechanisms do not incentivize high performance.  
1- An evaluation system unable to separate high from low performers in a systematic way 
                                                          
4 Boukhayatia, Rihab. "32,705 milliards de dinars, c'est le budget de l'Etat pour 2017." Al Huffington Post. October 
14, 2016. Accessed December 16, 2017. http://www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2016/10/14/tunisie-budget-de-letat-
_n_12487036.html.  
5 Ben Achour, Houcine. "Tunisie: 2018, le budget de tous les records." Anadolu Agency. October 20, 2017. 
Accessed December 16, 2017. http://aa.com.tr/fr/titres-de-la-journ%C3%A9e/tunisie-2018-le-budget-de-tous-les-
records-/943189 
6 Ibid. 
The system in place does not have systematic mechanisms to separate high performers from low 
performers, which is a prerequisite for establishing a link between incentives and performance. 
This is illustrated by weak evaluation metrics, which are partially explained by vague job 
descriptions that are neither task-specific nor skills-specific. Moreover, jobs are not specific to 
organizations but rather to “corps”, which means they are - for the most part - uniform across 
organizations. This high degree of centralization makes jobs more dependent on industrial 
relations of that time and less dependent on organizations’ needs. This section expands on these 
different elements and explains how they they interact with each other in a way that hinders the 
evaluation system.  
Evaluation metrics 
 The evaluation system takes the form of two employee ratings, both based on vague and non-
quantifiable criteria. The first rating is the annual professional rating (“note professionnelle”), 
which de jure plays a role in some promotion modes but has de facto been playing a less 
significant role. The second rating is the quarterly performance rating, which is tied to the 
quarterly performance bonus. The following table summarizes the criteria used in both ratings in 
the Ministry of Infrastructure, based on a case study conducted by researchers in the World Bank 
(Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). 
 Criteria Weight 
 Professional rating Work quality 20% 
   Work quantity 20% 
   Interpersonal relationships and conduct 20% 
   Attendance  20% 
   Perseverance 20% 
 Performance rating Work quality 40% 
   Work quantity 40% 
   Attendance  20% 
 
Criteria such as work quality, work quantity and perseverance are not defined through a more 
detailed rubric. Since these criteria are rated by each employee’s immediate supervisor, their 
definitions are left to the discretion of this supervisor who will use personal judgement in 
assigning ratings due to the limited guidance. It is therefore not surprising that attributing full 
ratings to all employees full is common practice. In fact, most employees receive at least 95 out 
of 100 in their professional rating, and the evaluation meeting that is supposed to be held once a 
year is almost never held (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). It would also not be 
surprising for this rating to highly depend on the personal relationship between employees and 
their immediate supervisors. Similar practices can be inferred about the performance rating. The 
poor design of the evaluation system makes evaluation quasi-absent in practice and vulnerable to 
internal politics.  
Job Descriptions 
Employees cannot be evaluated based on specific criteria if their roles are not sufficiently 
specific to be translated into targets. While in practice many employees have assigned tasks, the 
lack of specification on paper makes it impossible to reform the evaluation system in a 
systematic way, and makes the recruitment system vulnerable to unnecessary recruits. As an 
illustration for the vagueness of job descriptions, the table below summarizes the different roles 
of the “corps of general administrators” (“corps administratif commun”), as described in Decree 
85-267 of February 15th, 1985. 
Grade Role 
General Administrator ("Administrateur Général") 
Management, conception and coordination. They can also 
be charged of studies or general inspection. 
Chief Administrator ("Administrateur en Chef") 
Management, conception and coordination. They can also 
be charged of studies or control or inspection. 
Administrator Advisor ("Administrateur Conseiller") 
Administration, management, control and inspection tasks 
in specific services. 
Administrator ("Administrateur") 
Under the authority of their supervisor, they work on 
legislative projects - including laws, decrees, regulations 
and orders - and establish necessary modes for execution. 
They can also be responsible of ensuring the administrative 
or financial management of a specific service. 
Administration Officer ("Attaché d’Administration") 
Assist administrators and participate, under the authority of 
their supervisors, in completing tasks they are entrusted 
with. 
Executive Officer ("Attaché de Direction") 
Assit Administration Officers and participate, under the 
authority of their supervisors, in completing tasks they are 
entrusted with. 
Secretary of Administration ("Secrétaire 
d’Administration") 
Assit Executive Officers and participate, under the 
authority of their supervisors, in completing tasks they are 
entrusted with. 
Executive Secretary ("Secrétaire de Direction") 
Responsible of tasks related to their professional 
qualifications, namely typing and managing mails. 
Administrative Clerk ("Commis d’Administration") 
Responsible of administrative tasks, such as organization, 
accounting and simple communication. 
Typist ("Dactylographe") 
Responsible of tasks related to their professional 
qualifications, and could be responsible of organization 
and writing tasks. 
Typist Assistant ("Dactylographe Adjoint") Typing and basic writing tasks. 
Front Desk Receptionist ("Agent D'accueil") Serve as liaisons between bureaus and services. 
 
The roles described above are not only generic but also overlapping. Responsibilities are often 
just referred to as tasks but without clarifying what these tasks refer to. Moreover, descriptions 
neither include the exact skills needed nor the way the role fits within an organization or 
overarching mission. These flaws are likely to make individual accountability more difficult and 
make the system more vulnerable to internal politics. More importantly, they are likely to inhibit 
reform attempts of evaluation metrics, because a non-clearly defined job cannot be properly 
evaluated. 
Goals for agencies and for employees 
It is probably difficult to make responsibilities specific when they are uniform across agencies. 
While there is implicit knowledge of the difference in the work at one agency versus another, the 
lack of systemization remains a problem. While members of the same “corps” in different 
administrations have parallels in their roles, the tasks are not likely to be the same. More 
importantly, the output – or the work they produce – is certainly not the same since 
administrations differ in purpose and activity. Currently however, organization-specific roles will 
not be sufficient because administrations themselves lack measurable goals and Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs) (Labbaoui 2017). It is therefore difficult to design metrics for 
employees in absence of organization metrics.  
High centralization 
Centralization is demonstrated – for example - by the involvement of governing ministries not 
only in recruitment procedural details (Law 83-112, Article 16), but also in details related to 
promotions such as training program details, exams and conditions for passing these exams 
(Decree 85-263, Article 4). More importantly, it is illustrated in the uniform and generic job 
descriptions, as well as lack of organization-specific metrics. This degree of centralization may 
result, perhaps counter-intuitively, in an unexpected lack of accountability. In fact, the literature 
presents four major components which enforce public accountability (Haque 2000): First is the 
external-formal mechanisms, which include legislative instruments, executive means and judicial 
processes. Second is the external-informal mechanisms, including interest groups, opinion polls 
and media scrutiny. Third is internal-formal means, including codes of conducts, official 
hierarchies and performance reviews. Fourth is internal-informal mechanisms, such as 
organizational culture, professional ethics and peer pressure. While legislations representing 
external-formal mechanisms exist and while the role of media and different groups has been 
increasing post-revolution, centralization weakens the third component that enforces public 
accountability.  
 
This first section of the analysis is summarized in the diagram below. Overall, a weak evaluation 
system increases information asymmetry, which makes the system vulnerable to the principle-
agent problem – currently manifesting itself in a lack of satisfaction with services, paired with a 
large wage bill. 
 
 
 
2- A system that does not incentivize high performance  
Besides being unable to separate high from low performers because of weaknesses 
related to the evaluation system, the system in place does not incentivize high 
performance, and this is manifested in the current compensation structure as well as 
promotion mechanisms. 
Compensation structure 
“The current compensation structure prioritizes the notion of egalitarianism”, as Minister Ahmed 
Zarrouk described (Zarrouk, Advisor to the head of government in charge of civil service, 
governance and administrative reform 2017). While the intention is well-noted, the egalitarian 
principle does not seem to ensure fairness to high performers since their efforts are not rewarded.  
Currently, the most of the compensation is fixed – as mentioned in the background section – and 
the quarterly performance bonus represents about 2% of the overall compensation. For example, 
an inspection officer in the Bureau of Finances (category A3) receives a monthly salary of 1200 
TND, a yearly allowance around 5000 TND and a quarterly bonus performance of up to 
135TND. This means that over a year, this civil servant’s performance accounts for only 2.78% 
of her compensation. Moreover, as referred earlier, little variation exists in the performance 
rating across all employees, which leads to the performance bonus to be considered as an integral 
part of the salary (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015).  This means that compensation 
is 97-98% fixed on paper and 100% fixed in practice, which means that high-performers are not 
monetarily rewarded for their high performers, and low performers lose nothing for performing 
poorly. 
This could potentially result in the highly undesirable outcome of adverse selection – that civil 
service attract low-performing employees. High-performers may become likely to choose the 
private sector instead in order to be rewarded for their performance – especially if economic 
conditions improve and result in more job creation in the private sector. While we do not have 
sufficient data to make a definite claim, come informal interviews indicated talent retention as a 
current challenge in Civil Service – even if this was mentioned more in the context of comparing 
senior management salaries with those of private sector.  
 
Promotion 
Continuous training cycle 
Promotion through continuous training cycle is the one that most emphasizes competence 
development for the next grade.   
Civil servants who wish to be promoted undertake continuous training cycles, which last 6 
months for those who wish to be promoted from category A3 to category A2 or from category 
A2 to category A1, and 4 months for those who wish to be promoted from category B to 
category A3 (Hamam 2018). Currently, there is no continuous training cycle for employees in 
categories C and D (Hamam 2018).  
While this promotion mechanism aims to develop competences needed in the next grade, it 
implies that promotion depends on performance on the training cycle, but not performance on the 
current job - as promotion depends on performance in the exit exam.  
In addition, admissions to these training cycles present a set of issues. Admissions require a 
preparatory phases, which consists of distance-learning of modules that add up to 15 credits, and 
which can range from Public Finance and Fiscality to Constitutional Law, Commercial Law, 
Economics and Environmental studies (Order of July 14th, 1995 n.d.). The admissions exam 
takes place about twice a year, and requires a weighted average of 10/20 to pass (L’Ecole 
Nationale d’Administration n.d.).  
This mode of admissions is problematic first because it bases admission to a promotion 
opportunity by studying, not by performing well on the job. Second, studying requires a high 
time commitment, which makes promotion difficult to access. In fact, no more than 300 civil 
servants pass the admissions exams each year (Hamam 2018). Accessibility is even more 
challenging for employees of interior regions, due to the absence of means of pedagogical 
support and due to commuting costs to take the exams. This n turn contributes to a slowdown in 
career advancement, because the training sessions are only offered if there is a minimum number 
of participants. Further, this promotion mechanism – in its current form – seems to be penalizing 
high performers. In Ahmed Zarrouk’s words, “The promotion system in place does not 
encourage those who work. On the contrary, it penalizes those who work” (Zarrouk 2017). As he 
further explained, hard-workers are given more tasks and responsibilities, and thus do not have 
the time to prepare for those exams; they are therefore less likely to be promoted. 
Internal Competitive procedure  
Internal competitive procedure normally takes the form of application or exam. While the exam 
itself has a set of imperfections, there has been increasing use of the application-based 
competitive procedure, which is problematic for three reasons. First, it promotes the use of a 
budget-based promotion, instead of promotion based on organization needs (Saidi 2017): 
promotion budgets are negotiated between ministries and the Ministry of Finance, then each 
ministry decides how many promotions they will offer and for which grade based on the budget 
they receive. Most grades are decided based on budgets and distributive efforts, not on agencies’ 
needs. Based on the number of eligible candidates, the percentage of promotion is pre-
announced. While it has historically been around 30 to 50% rate, it has often become around 
100% in recent years (Saidi 2017) due to union negotiations and pressures. This is evidence of 
the flaw in the way number of promotions is determined, as it becomes vulnerable to industrial 
relations and political climates, and less institutionalized. Second, this easy process could be 
crowding out the demand for continuous training cycles, which has been decreasing in recent 
years (Hamam 2018). Third, this mechanism emphasizes seniority, which effectively means that 
civil servants with more seniority are promoted, and no further effort is required.  
By having promotion mechanisms that do not reflect performance, high performers interested in 
career advancement and more responsibilities are unlikely to find what they look for as civil 
servants. This could make it difficult for government to retain those desired talents, where these 
types of employees would leave for other opportunities, which further increases the risk for 
adverse selection.  
In summary, even if high performers are successfully identified, there are no mechanisms to 
reward them. The current compensation structure is fixed both by design and by practice. 
Different promotion mechanisms also have different flaws. Continuous training cycles have 
demanding admissions criteria, which hinders its accessibility, but also makes promotion tied to 
competence acquired in the training, instead of job performance. The next section of the paper 
proposes solutions, based on this diagnosis, as well as practices in other case studies. 
 
Proposed Solutions 
Overall Approach to Reform 
The first significant reform was attempted in 1989, followed by different reform initiatives. 
However, the problems identified in 1989 – as identified in the Seminar on Modernizing the 
Administration in 1989 - persist today (Brockmeyer, Khatrouch and Raballand 2015). While this 
could be attributed to multiple factors, two possible explanations may be offered.  
First, the publicly available information from the seminar’s conclusions comes in the form of 
weakness-recommendation pairs, not in the form of specific steps. To overcome this issue, 
reform proposals need to take a process approach and come in the form of action plans instead, 
by outlining specific steps, as well as the prerequisites they need to be executed.  
Second, this could be explained by the Behavioral Economics concepts of Planning Fallacy and 
Optimism Bias (Raballand and Anand 2013). Planning Fallacy stands for “the tendency of 
people and organizations to underestimate the time it will take to complete a task” (Raballand 
and Anand 2013). Optimism Bias is the “belief that despite the evidence of past projects, the 
current project is somehow exempt from the risks that affected previous attempts” (Raballand 
and Anand 2013). In the context of civil service reform, these biases mean that governments tend 
to underestimate the time to implement reform projects and to be overoptimistic about the project 
outcomes, and the Tunisian government is probably not an exception (Raballand and Anand 
2013). This contributes to ambitious visions that are difficult to translate into small actions and 
observable improvements. Smaller scale projects may be effective in reducing these two biases, 
as suggested by a World Bank project in Cameroon’s Customs (Raballand and Anand 2013).  
While much of the reform involves systemization, the actual implementation may need to be 
delegated and piloted on small scales. In the mentioned World Bank project, the pilot project was 
effective in engaging and onboarding stakeholders, improving the outcomes in an observable and 
significant way, measuring progress in a tangible way, and collecting feedback. Such small scale 
projects have therefore the potential to provide feedback on the envisioned time frame and 
results, helping reduce the two biases. That being said, this approach will challenge the 
egalitarian culture, as the success of such approach depends on the small scale, and thus on an 
active decision to choose one pilot organization and not others. Communicating the vision and 
collaborating with international organizations such as the World bank could help navigate the 
politics of reform. 
Reforming the Evaluation System 
The Tunisian government needs to pursue decentralization in order to design a job catalogue, and 
design better evaluation metrics that will be able to separate high performers from low 
performers.  
Decentralization 
The Tunisian government needs to decentralize the civil service employment system in order to 
improve the evaluation system. The first step of decentralization is between the head of 
government and ministries. Some governments have been decentralizing their employment 
management systems. For example, the employment system in Denmark consists of a central 
unit – the Agency of Modernization of Public Administration at Ministry of Finance – which is 
responsible for defining human resource (HR) policy. However, recruitment, management of 
bonuses and performance appraisals are managed by HR units in ministries of interest (OECD, 
Denmark 2012). Denmark is referred to as an example because it has among the highest citizens 
satisfaction rates with public service OECD satisfaction. The second step of decentralization is 
between ministries and related agencies. Furthermore, Canada’s reform project in the 1990s 
showed that holding specific decision-makers in these agencies, namely directors and managers, 
accountable for implementation results has proven more effective in increasing accountability 
(Labbaoui 2017). Decentralization at the government level and further delegation to related 
agencies, while holding specific decision-makers accountable could make decentralization 
effective and help set a foundation for the reform of evaluation system.  
Job Catalogue Design  
The generic and overlapping job descriptions need to be replaced by a job catalogue that defines 
the nature of the job activity as well as the way the way the role fits into the organization. In 
addition, it should not be based on education as the only eligibility criterion for applicants, but 
rather on skills and competences required to perform the job. This reform step has proven 
feasible in Morocco, which is also a career-based system that uses a corps-category-grade 
structure (OECD 2010).  In a multistep reform that started in 2004, the Moroccan government 
redefined a job catalogue where positions are classified based on 6 characteristics: activity, tasks, 
skills, place in organization, objectives and level of responsibility (OECD 2010). To take into 
account the common activities of members of the same corps, these jobs are further classified 
into “whole of government corps” and “specialized corps” (OECD 2010). They also assign civil 
servants to each of four “ranks”: managerial positions, expertise-based positions, supervisory 
positions and front-line positions. This enabled to make jobs agency-specific while recognizing 
their commonalities, but also introduce useful segmentation criteria such as tasks, skills and 
places in organizations. While the Tunisian context is not exactly identical, the Moroccan case 
study shows that this step is feasible and presents an opportunity for collaboration and specific 
exchange of actionable knowledge. 
Evaluation Metrics Redefinition  
A job catalogue will make it easier to determine an evaluation grid of quantifiable metrics. Once 
the job is related to an activity that is clearly defined, agency-specific and skill-based, it will 
become possible to develop quantifiable metrics. While profitability makes designing these 
metrics in the private sector easier, case studies show that governments are able to find ways to 
implement such metrics. For instance, Denmark uses a more output-driven approach (OECD, 
Denmark 2012), while Bahrain uses a competence-based approach (OECD 2010). Bahrain 
started implementing a competency-based model for evaluation, as part of an HR reform agenda 
for the period of 2008-2014, which takes the form of a dictionary of 92 competencies with 5 
levels of competency ranging from basic to expert. Using a competence-based system has also 
the benefit of identifying gaps between the competence level that a job requires and the 
competence level that the civil servant has, which can then inform training sessions (OECD 
2010). Overall, more specific criteria that are based on competences, as well as outputs dictated 
by the job description, could make the evaluation system less vague and more credible. 
Reform the Reward System 
The reward system could be reformed by addressing issues in the compensation structure and by 
reforming promotion mechanisms.  
Compensation Structure  
The compensation structure will be able to reward high performance through the introduction of 
Performance-related pay (PRP) (OECD, The State of the Public Service 2008). While PRP can 
take the form of both merit increment (equivalent to pay raise) or one-off bonus (a one-time 
bonus), the latter is better suited for the Tunisian context – especially given the budget limits. 
That being said, the performance bonus should represent a larger percentage of the total 
compensation than the current 2-3%. In countries that use PRP for most their government 
employees not only to senior management, and that use the one-off bonus form not the merit 
increment form, this bonus represents up to 10% (Germany) or even 20% (Hungary, which has 
also been reform reforming its civil service employment system (Hazafi 2016)). In addition, a 
stronger evaluation system will serve as a reliable foundation for a credible and fair bonus 
system. Another idea to consider is to design tiers of bonuses, depending on different 
performance levels, to ease the acceptance of a more important role of PRP and to reinforce the 
notion of differentiation in the assignment of bonus payment. 
Promotion Mechanisms  
Promotion system needs to be redesigned to be reflective of performance. First, the law needs to 
be changed to reflect the current practices in order to limit deviation from the de jure 
mechanisms. Second, “grades” schemes need to be regenerated to better reflect organization 
needs and clear differences between the contributions of different grades; in other words, they 
should reflect a well-designed job catalogue.  
Lastly, since a more robust evaluation system would facilitate a performance-based promotion 
system (Zarrouk 2008), promotion should be based on criteria that draw on performance-related 
evaluation metrics, and training cycles should shift from being a promotion mode to a 
competence development mechanism. This recommendation is based on a strong belief that 
promotion should reflect the current job performance, not the performance on the training itself.  
Recognizing the value of L’Ecole Nationale d’Administration, this paper envisions three 
programs. The first is a continuous training cycle for non-senior civil servants, which would be 
offered to top-performers, and replace the education requirements of the next grade, and develop 
the competences needed by the next grade. The second is a continuous training cycle for senior 
civil servants – or a leadership program; this would be offered to senior civil servants who have 
strong track records and are on leadership track. The third is a general training program that 
consists of short-term training cycles to reinforce employees’ competences; there would be a list 
of training modules to be completed for promotion eligibility, but only as one among many 
performance criteria. This would not be a unique practice. In Denmark for example, public 
employees receive 5-7 yearly training days on average (OECD, Denmark 2012).  
In summary, the existing system could reward high performers through promotions if “grades” 
reflect a well-designed job catalogue and promotion criteria reflect a well-designed evaluation 
system. In the long-term, the other promotion mechanisms should be abandoned.  
Some suggested immediate steps 
There are also some more immediate steps – that are not entirely structural – but could help with 
a structural reform. 
First, an immediate and feasible step to undertake is to compile the decrees and orders related to 
civil service employment and map the complementarity of those different legislative texts in one 
accessible online directory. While there has been progress on facilitating online access to such 
resources, they are not mapped in a way that shows their interrelation. Undertaking such a 
project could facilitate the engagement of different stakeholders, scholars and organizations to 
start a reform dialogue, as it would increase transparency and make the topic more accessible to 
people who are not expert in Tunisian Law. The French Ministry of Public Accounts for instance 
compiles all information related to Employment Management System under the Portal of Civil 
Service (Ministere de l'Action et de la Fonction Publique n.d.). 
Second, reducing the size of the government by incentivizing voluntary retirement may be a 
necessary step to address the immediate pressure of the wage bill but also as an intermediate step 
to make structural reform possible. This policy was followed by Morocco in their reform project 
(OECD 2010). That being said, this will not be sufficient in altering the view of government as 
employer of last resort: changing this view will job opportunities in the private sector, enabled 
through a business-friendly environment – which is an entire project reform in itself. 
 
Conclusion 
The Tunisian Civil Service Employment System needs to undertake a series of structural reforms 
in order to identify and reward high performers, and hence improve overall performance of Civil 
Service. While the wage bill and fiscal deficit make reforms challenging, fiscal crises can push 
for greater efficiency, and recent democratization can generate promises of “more service 
oriented, less corrupt and more accountable public administrations” (Bunse and Fritz 2012).  
Such reforms will require managing politics of reforms and aligning interests of different 
stakeholders around a unique vision. While this is challenging, dialogue between stakeholders is 
what earned the Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet the 2015 Nobel Peace Prize.  
Furthermore, through successful reform steps, Tunisia has the opportunity to show leadership 
since these problems exit in other countries, including countries in the MENA region. 
Next research steps could involve focusing on one ministry or agency for in-depth primary 
research. Projects like compiling legislative texts or creating an organization chart of all state 
agencies could also contribute in facilitating access to information and understanding of the 
Tunisian Civil Service. 
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